In this article the 'manufactured' factual indeterminacy now ubiquitous within the practice of international taxation is presented as a result of intersecting global approaches to the theory of law. It is argued that tax law practice assumes a mixture of the theoretical positions averred by Hans Kelsen, Karl Llewellyn, and Ronald Dworkin. To combat the problems raised by this, a 'Soft Realism' approach is proposed in the application of tax heuristics to deal with cases of factual indeterminacy. Drawing some implications from this analysis, the debate over general anti-avoidance rules and complex tax avoidance strategies (eg 'treaty-shopping' and 'double non-taxation') is oriented within the overall framework of tax jurisprudence. Finally, it is argued that the globalisation of tax jurisprudence has enabled accounting firms to actively spread manufactured factual indeterminacy around the world, corrupting the purpose of the law in part by exploiting the weaknesses of formalistic legal interpretation.
distinct legal theories is useful because it exposes how globalisation has contributed to the intersection of various approaches to the law in the field of international taxation. For example, in a 'hard' case the Kelsenian tax advisor may find the decisions of US courts in tax cases based on normative principles potentially in violation of the Rule of Law. 10 Meanwhile, the US tax advisor may find a formalised legal methodology to be divorced from hermeneutic tax language rendering the analysis unrelated to the actual practice of tax law. The current state of the global practice of tax law is thus characterised as a composite of these methods where formalism is assumed in 'easy cases' whereas Dworkinian principle-based reasoning often holds sway in 'hard cases'. 11 However, contrary to the claims of formalists and Dworkinians about the determinacy of law, tax law is often indeterminate. This is particularly true where tax laws are not enforced consistently. Accordingly, this article suggests that the current practice of tax law should be reconceptualised as simultaneously reflective of formalism and what shall be described here as 'soft' legal realism.
12
'Soft realism' (explained in detail below) should replace the extant formalistDworkinian composite approach in indeterminate tax cases. 13 It is similar to Frederick
Schauer's 'Tamed Realism', except that it applies only in cases of factual indeterminacy.
14 This limited realism is thus logically consistent with lawyers assuming an antithetical formalism in cases with determinate facts. 15 However, because of the unique aspect of tax practice where multinational firms are able to 'manufacture' factual indeterminacy using affiliated legal entities, then perhaps even the majority of tax cases would be legally Review 1915 ('For any particular lay person, the law, with respect to any particular set of facts, is a decision of a court with respect to those facts so far as that decision affects that particular person. Until a court has passed on those facts no law on that subject is yet in existence. Prior to such decision, the only law available is the opinion of lawyers as to the law relation to that person and to those facts. Such opinion is not actually law but only a guess as to what a court will decide.') citing Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (Transaction 1930). 13 For a comprehensive discussion see below Section D. 14 Frederick Schauer, 'Legal Realism Untamed' (2013) 91 Texas Law Review 749 ('Law is not only about hard cases. There are easy ones as well, and understanding law requires awareness not only of litigated and then appealed disputes, but also the routine application of legal rules and doctrines.') citing Andrei Marmor, Interpretation and Legal Theory (Clarendon Press, 1992) . 15 For a definition of 'formalism' in comparison to 'realism', see Brian Leiter, 'Legal Formalism and Legal Realism: What is the Issue?' (2010) 16(2) Legal Theory 111 ('"Formalist" theories claim that … the law is "rationally" determinate, ie, the class of legitimate legal reasons available for a judge to offer in support of is decision justifies one and only one outcome… the majority of "Realists" advanced a descriptive theory of adjudication according to which (1) legal reasoning is indeterminate (ie, fails to justify a unique outcome) in those cases that reach the stage of appellate review; (2) appellate judges, in deciding cases, are responsive to the "situation-types"-recurring factual patterns … that elicit predictable normative responses.').
indeterminate from a formalistic perspective (ie, not cognizable in formalistic terms), 16 thus leading to double non-taxation, for example. 17 The article proceeds in the following fashion. First, a primer on legal methodology for tax lawyers is provided as an introduction; second, legal realism in tax methodology is summarised in detail with regard to manufactured factual indeterminacy; third, the role of heuristics (ie, technical tax language) is discussed as a matter of tax methodology; fourth, the relation of General Anti-Avoidance Rules (GAARs) in an era of globalised factual indeterminacy is defined; and finally, the globalisation and dissemination of manufactured factual indeterminacy (primarily by accounting firms) is oriented as a matter of tax jurisprudence.
B. A PRIMER ON LEGAL METHODOLOGY FOR TAX LAWYERS
The practice of global business taxation can be understood as a medley of formalism, Dworkinian principles-based interpretation and 'Bramble Bush' realism. 18 Often, in 'easy' cases, the tax lawyer reads the Internal Revenue Code and interprets the provision in a formalistic manner. In hard cases the common law tax lawyer looks to broader principles to determine the best result in true Dworkinian fashion. 19 However, as a matter of tax planning the tax lawyer must predict what the taxing authority is likely to do as a matter of tax 16 Brian Leiter, 'Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence' (1997) 76 Texas Law Review 267, 277-8 'Formalism is committed to the descriptive claim that judges respond primarily -indeed, perhaps exclusively -to the rational demands of the applicable rules of law and modes of legal reasoning'. 17 'Double-non taxation' refers to the lack of income taxation for a multinational firm levied in either the source state or residence state under an applicable tax treaty. The term is essentially a euphemism for the idea that the multinational firm has successfully avoided income taxation on an item of corporate income. The corollary term is 'double-taxation' which is a situation where an item of income is taxed in both the source state and residence under a tax treaty, or where a tax treaty is not in force. In general, tax treaties are entered into to avoid the circumstance of 'double-taxation' and will be entitled: 'Tax Treaty for the Avoidance of Double Taxation', but increasingly to the contrary, multinational firms apply such tax treaties to achieve 'double-non taxation' as opposed to a single layer of taxation; see also However, Dworkin would deny this because lawyers arguing before a court and judges deciding upon the appropriate outcome do not make judgements based upon subjective preferences but upon reasons that they take to actually justify their conclusions.
Kelsen and Tax Law
In Thus, law may be an idealised abstraction for Kelsen, but it is totally separate from moral thought. 36 Christoph Kletzer described this aspect of Kelsenian theory as 'negative positivism':
The validity and the content of the positive law cannot be derived from moral premises, In any legal system whether a given norm is legally valid depends entirely on the law; 
Dworkin and Tax Law in Hard Cases
Dworkin wrote on the nature and interpretation of law in general but with reference to hard cases in particular. 52 Hard cases can arise for a number of reasons but in the tax context they typically emerge when the meaning of a provision of a tax statute is disputed. Schauer describes them as follows:
To the extent that one can find an answer to a question by a straightforward reading of rules, other factors may make a case hard. A case that seems linguistically easy may be hard if the result announced by the language is inconsistent with the 'purpose' of the rule. In such cases the tension between the plain meaning of the words and the reason for using those words creates a hard case, in much the same way that linguistic imprecision creates a hard case.
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As an example, the tax issue might be how to levy tax on a discounted bond prior to the implementation of the Original Issue Discount (OID) rules in the mid-1980s. As a general rule, hard cases are more likely to arise where the legislature is unable to agree on all of the specific terms of a tax statute in advance and so drafts the code in a principled format and leaves it to the taxing authority to work out the details. The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) takes this 'If legal cognition encounters legal norms that contradict one another in content, it seeks, by interpreting their meaning, to resolve the contradiction as a mere pseudo-contradiction. If this effort fails, legal cognition disposes of the material to be interpreted, disposes of it as lacking in meaning altogether and therefore as non-existent in the legal sphere qua realm of meaning'. 49 ibid 67. 50 'Treaty-shopping' refers to the formation of an affiliate entity by a multinational in a jurisdiction with a favorable tax treaty network solely to obtain the tax benefit from the treaty network. See generally Leslie Green, 'The Concept of Law Revisited' (1996) 94 Michigan Law Review 1687 'The reason for the validity of a norm can only be another norm, and thus the ultimate reason for the validity of law must be a norm rather than a matter of fact. This "transcendental-logical presupposition" Kelsen called the Grundnorm. So while Kelsen is a positivist -law may have any content and there is no necessary connection between law and morality -he is not a social constructivist … sociology, psychology, political theory, economics, etc -are for him all "alien elements" that lead only to the "adulteration" of a pure theory of law'. In such a situation, every lawyer unavoidably applies and interprets international uniform law by using his or her "home law." This approach is problematic in that there may be objectively justified doubts of a "reasonable above national bystander's" proper interpretation of a term in the Convention, whereas the meaning is well-defined under a given "home law"'. 58 James Donato, 'Dworkin and Subjectivity in Legal Interpretation' (1988) 40 Stanford Law Review 1517, 1531. 59 ibid 1533. 60 ibid 1523-4 ('The ability of Kelsen's theory to achieve this height of purity depends on the efficacy of his concept of the basic norm. For both legal science and the practical world of legal norms, the basic norm validates
As such, Dworkin shares with the formalists a belief that the law is determinate but he differs as to why. For him, determinate answers are possible through the application of moral principles because political morality holds determinate truths.
The Bramble Bush in Tax Jurisprudence
The Bramble Bush refers to a version of legal realism popularised by Karl Llewellyn, where he avers that the adjudication (and enforcement) of the law is the law. 61 As explained by Richman:
Llewellyn's argument was that law is not about the externally imposed rules for conduct, but rather disputes and how one predicts what someone is going to do in order to resolve the dispute. Law is not about what is 'right,' but rather, and almost exclusively, lawyers devote themselves to predicting what a particular court will do.
Law is 'what law does.' More important than 'right' and 'wrong' is that disputes are settled; this is the function and province of law.
62
A great deal of general jurisprudence focuses on adjudication rather than enforcement practices, 63 but in the tax context enforcement practices by taxing authorities are a crucial aspect of practice that any realist approach must account for. For example, income tax laws generally require taxpayers to self-report so, depending on the sophistication of their legal advice, they may be able to engage in tax avoidance before filing of the return itself. Only after the voluntary reporting of taxable income does the taxing authority begin enforcement. Insofar as the enforcement of tax laws depends on a voluntary reporting system Llewellyn´s observation is particularly applicable. This is because there may be factual or legal indeterminacy on a particular transaction but also enforcement indeterminacy in that an aggressive tax transaction may never be challenged. 64 other norms through a test of creation. Since norms are neither true nor false, a norm's validity must flow as a grant from some higher norm. At the apex of this normative chain lies the basic norm. This norm constitutes the highest validity-granting authority in the legal order; it is "the presupposed starting point of a procedure: the procedure of positive law creation." As a procedure, the basic norm confers validity by testing a lower norm's genesis rather than its content. A lower norm created in accordance with the procedures laid down by the basic norm is a valid norm.') (citations omitted). 61 See Llewellyn (n 9). If an avoidance scheme cannot achieve a reduction in tax liability without secrecy, it is hard to see it as legal in any robust sense. A scheme that will clearly be struck down if it should ever be challenged seems to be only weakly or contingently within the law'.
Formalism and Easy Cases
In run-of-the-mill tax disputes (ie, easy cases) the assumption of formalism often allows lawyers to quickly and easily resolve matters. Frederick Schauer described the 'easy case' with regard to Constitutional law jurisprudence as follows:
Once we expand our notion of a 'case' to include all legal events, it becomes do not stipulate this clause, there is no legal basis to assume that the states wanted to prevent double non-taxation.
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Accordingly, if the fact pattern at issue falls outside the positivist framework of the tax treaty then the legal analysis is rendered null. In other words, the interpretational result of 'double non-taxation' (or 'double taxation') says that the tax treaty interpretation cannot resolve the interpretational dispute.
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D. 'SOFT REALISM', WITTGENSTEIN AND TAX JURISPRUDENCE
An application of formalism with regard to easy cases, and then legal realism in the more difficult cases, might be referred to as a version of 'soft realism'. The idea of soft realism is that in certain cases tax law is determinative enough to allow for a formalistic analysis, whilst in others indeterminacy necessarily pertains. Accordingly, a hierarchy of methods would be better suited as an interpretational method as a matter of international tax law. This hierarchy is:
(i) Easy Cases: Formalist legal interpretation of a statute or tax treaty provision leads to determinative result. As applied to the easy cases of tax law a formalistic approach (which is applied in most jurisdictions) tends toward consistency and predictability in the application of law to simple fact.
(ii) Cases of Legal Indeterminacy: Formalist legal interpretation of a statute or tax treaty provision fails to reach a determinative result (eg, double non-taxation).This potential for legal indeterminacy was questioned by Dworkin, for example, and not all jurisdictions allowed for a null legal result (ie, double non-taxation). The state in which the company is established may not tax the profits of the company because the state regards the company as a transparent entity and the owners of the entity are non-residents with no permanent establishment (PE) in that state. At the same time, the state of residence of the owners of the company may not tax the profits of the company until profits are actually distributed to the owners of the company because the state regards the company as a non-transparent foreign entity'. 71 Note that Continental Europe and Latin America by applying a formalistic method do not necessarily resolve hard cases of legal indeterminacy resulting in 'double non-taxation' as a matter of law, for example. In other common law jurisdictions, such as the United States, courts may resolve hard cases of tax law by looking to outside 'normative' principles. Hence, as it stands, the current practice of international tax law is not consistent in the case of strictly legal indeterminacy.
Before going on we must once and for all distinguish factual indeterminacy and strictly Similarly, Dworkinian theory assumes all legal matters are determinate as a matter of law.
However, within international tax law factual indeterminacy is the predominant consideration of the tax law. Thus, the Dworkinian approach also does not resolve the problem of manufactured factual indeterminacy.
Wittgenstein and Tax Heuristics
A hermeneutic methodology for law contemplates an interpretational method as determined by the technical language of legal practitioners. This fits into a general realist theory where 72 The difference in interpretive method as between various taxing jurisdictions (eg, as between Continental Europe and Latin America versus the US) in the case of strictly legal indeterminacy is not the thesis of this article which relates to manufactured factual indeterminacy. This is a different type of indeterminacy. For an example of legal indeterminacy in the case of inconsistent enforcement of laws, see Bogenschneider, 'A Proposal for Equal Enforcement of the AET' (n 22). 73 See generally Kletzer (n 37) at 97 'One cannot ask a legal question, one cannot say or think anything legal without already having presupposed the basic norm … The law presupposes its own validity. It is thus the law itself and not we that presupposes the basic norm and presupposing the basic norm the positive law posits itself'. John Prebble at one point accused tax law of 'incomprehensibility' because the technical tax language or 'heuristics' comprises its own 'Ectopia' or special language. 77 However, the existence of tax heuristics actually counts in favour of taxation as a scientific discipline because it tends toward replicable results in application. 78 In order to understand this point more clearly, we must direct our attention to the 'linguistic turn' in postmodern philosophic thought, which is often associated with Ludwig Wittgenstein. 79 Kavka described the target of the 'linguistic turn' in the following terms: 'The common misconception about learning language is that it consists mainly in adults teaching children the names of things by ostensive definition -that is, by pointing to things and saying their names.' 80 More recently, this mistake has been described as 'semantic formalism' (ie, label-making) as a form of linguistics, which was a major target of Wittgenstein´s philosophical critique. 81 Modern thinkers reasonably disagree on whether the linguistic turn holds any relevance for contemporary jurisprudence. 82 But, whether or not the linguistic turn ought to be adopted by those studying the nature of law does not necessarily resolve whether it ought to apply to tax law practice. Along these lines, Yovel argues that a flexible approach to meaning is also applied in contract law, which is strongly analogous to tax law in this respect. an easy case. This is distinguishable from Dworkinian theory because tax heuristics are not, and do not purport to be, moral principles.
The Example of a Shiny, Yellow, Ductile Metal, or 'Gold'
The proposal that we make use of language in legal practice to render hard cases more determinate has been challenged on the grounds that not all words are subject to interpretation. 86 For example, Leslie Green points out that the substance the word 'gold'
references cannot be subject to interpretation because it is necessarily a 'shiny, yellow, ductile metal.' 87 His claim is that the ordinary meaning of 'gold' is settled, by common usage, as referring to such a substance and that insofar as scientific usage is concerned, 'gold' can be defined with reference to the periodic table of elements. This means that neither gold itself, nor either its common or scientific usage can be interpreted as a legal or linguistic convention in use:
[I]t would be absurd to conclude from the fact that the meaning of 'gold' is fixed by an interpretive practice that gold is an interpretive practice -rather than, say, a heavy, Yet, that is almost precisely a description of the state of affairs vis-à-vis the meaning of the word 'gold'. The ordinary meaning of the word 'gold' is quite different based on the context in which it is used. It might refer to one particular stick in a box of crayons, to a 14 karat gold necklace, or a 24 karat gold coin. For example, in the purchase of an engagement ring, the distinction between 14 karat gold and 24 karat gold is crucial. By contrast, when an investor sells a Roman-era 'gold' coin (eg, 50% purity) the United States Department of the Treasury expects a remittance of tax as a collectible. Yet, if the same profit is accrued on the Gold ETF the United States Department of the Treasury typically expects an amount to be reported as capital gain. Accordingly, the term 'gold' is particularly ripe for linguistic analysis and the heuristics of tax law might be consulted to identify the interpretation of the meaning of the word 'gold' in a specific tax context.
E. THE 'MANUFACTURE' OF FACTUAL INDETERMINACY IMPLIES GAAR
A committed formalist would consider the idea a general anti-avoidance rule to be an oxymoron because they would not account for the possibility of factual indeterminacy. 92 Under this view, 90 Internal Revenue Service, Private Letter Ruling 200217059 'With respect to your ruling request, we believe that, based on the information submitted and the representations contained herein, that bullion coins and bullion bars that are assets of IRAs in the physical possession of Company M or its affiliate, Company N, are collectibles within the meaning of Section 408(m)(1) of the Code'. 91 Green, 'Legal Realism as a Theory of Law' (n 12) 1917. 92 Yovel, 'What is Contract Law "About"? Speech Act Theory and a Critique of "Skeletal Promises"' (n 76) 959 'A Kelsenian (and Kantian) understanding of normativity is even more removed from SAT: the former approach all indeterminacy is comprised of legal indeterminacy on application to determinative facts.
Furthermore, under Kelsen's approach, posing the possibility of a GAAR implies reference to extra-legal normativity and the pollution of pure legal reasoning. A more moderate position advanced by Prebble is that, by the application of a GAAR, so many extra-legal considerations enter into tax jurisprudence that the Rule of Law is put in jeopardy because tax statutes cannot be interpreted based on what Prebble would consider the ordinary meaning of words. 93 Indeed,
GAARs are now the subject of intense debate in tax circles across Europe after the European
Commission recently added an anti-abuse rule for tax avoidance transactions. 94 Furthermore, the OECD is now considering the addition of a Limitation on Benefits (or anti-abuse) provision, to its model treaty. 95 However, in the case of manufactured factual indeterminacy the role of the GAAR is more straightforward. 96 The entry of the 'bad man' into legal practice requires a response, particularly in the taxation context. That is, the law should be seen as incorporating certain principles even without the existence of a statute setting them forth. This was at least the view of Llewellyn:
If, as Karl Llewellyn argued, judicial belief in an implicit obligation of good faith in contractual dealing drove contract decisions in a predictable fashion even before this obligation was included within Article 2 of the UCC, the obligation of good faith was the law according to the prediction theory even before it was so included. 97 The English common law refers to this as the 'mischief rule'. A common-law GAAR related to tax avoidance is exactly such a mischief rule because the 'bad man' is engaged in
